Hi,
The following patch set is our second proposals of SE-PostgreSQL.
It contains many of fixes and improvements from the previous version.
Please add them a reviwing queue of the next commit fest.
Thanks,
List of Patches
===============
[1/4] Core facilities of PGACE/SE-PostgreSQL
http://sepgsql.googlecode.com/files/sepostgresql-sepgsql-8.4devel-3-r914.patch
[2/4] "--enable-selinux" option of pg_dump/pg_dumpall
http://sepgsql.googlecode.com/files/sepostgresql-pg_dump-8.4devel-3-r914.patch
[3/4] Default security policy for SE-PostgreSQL
http://sepgsql.googlecode.com/files/sepostgresql-policy-8.4devel-3-r914.patch
[4/4] Documentation updates
http://sepgsql.googlecode.com/files/sepostgresql-docs-8.4devel-3-r914.patch
We can provide a quick overview for SE-PostgreSQL at:
http://code.google.com/p/sepgsql/wiki/WhatIsSEPostgreSQL
http://sepgsql.googlecode.com/files/PGCON20080523.pdf
Compile and Installation
========================
The following items are requirements of SE-PostgreSQL.
- Fedora 8 or later system
- SELinux is enabled, and working
- kernel-2.6.23 or later
- selinux-policy and selinux-policy-devel v3.0.8 or later
- libselinux, policycoreutils, checkpolicy
The followings are step by step installation.
$ cvs -z3 -d :pserver:anoncvs@anoncvs.postgresql.org:/projects/cvsroot \
export -r HEAD -d pgsql
$ cd pgsql
$ patch -p1 < sepostgresql-sepgsql-8.4devel-3-r914.patch
$ patch -p1 < sepostgresql-pg_dump-8.4devel-3-r914.patch
$ patch -p1 < sepostgresql-policy-8.4devel-3-r914.patch
$ patch -p1 < sepostgresql-docs-8.4devel-3-r914.patch
$ ./configure --enable-selinux
$ make
$ make -C ./contrib/sepgsql_policy
$ su
# /usr/sbin/semodule -i ./contrib/sepgsql_policy/sepostgresql.pp ... [1]
# make install
# /sbin/restorecon -R /usr/local/pgsql
$ mkdir -p $PGDATA
$ chcon -t postgresql_db_t -R $PGDATA
$ initdb
$ pg_ctl start
[1] If "selinux-policy-3.4.2" or later is installed on your system,
install "sepostgresql-devel.pp" instead.
In this version, most of SE-PostgreSQL's policy are got mainlined.
Updates from the previous version
=================================
o A new type of "security_label" has gone
In the previous one, "security_context" system column is declared as
security_label type. This type had its input handler, and it translated
a given text representation into an internal Oid value with looking up
pg_security system catalog. If it's not found, the input handler inserts
a new entry automatically.
The following query can show the reason why this design is problematic.
SELECT 'system_u:object_r:sepgsql_db_t'::security_label;
This query seems to us read-only, but it has a possibility to insert
a new tuple into pg_security implicitly.
In this version, "security_context" system column is re-defined as a TEXT
type attribute, and a given text representation is translated into internal
identifier (Oid) just before insert or update a tuple. This design change
enables to make sure pg_security is not modified in read-only queries.
o Query modification has gone.
In the previous one, SE-PostgreSQL modified WHERE/JOIN ON clause to apply
tuple-level access controls, but its implementation is a bit complicated.
In addition, this design had a possibility to conflict with a new MS patent.
Now we put a hook on ExecScan to apply tuple-level access controls.
It enables to reduce code complexity and avoid patent conflicts.
o Scanning with SnapshotSelf has gone.
In the previous one, we had to scan some system catalogs with SnapshotSelf
mode at three points (pg_class, pg_largeobject and pg_security).
* When we defines a relation on heap_create_with_catalog(), a tuple of
pg_class and several tuples of pg_attribute are inserted within same
command id.
A tuple of pg_class has to be refered just before inserting tuples of
pg_attribute, because a new column inherits the security context of its
parent relation in the default. But we cannot find it because these are
inserted within same command id and SnapshotNow scanning mode ignores
these tuples. We cannot invoke CommandIdIncrement() here, because it
finally checks integrity of relation cache, but the relation is not
constructed yet.
We can apply two option here. One is preserving the security context
of parent table and applying it later without looking up pg_class.
The other is to insert a temporary entry into SysCache until it is
invalidated.
The later approach can also be applied on the next situation, so we
now put InsertSysCache() withing heap_create_with_catalog() to refer
the new tuple before next CommandIdIncrement() which is invoked just
after hecp_create_with_catalog().
* When a user gives a security context in text representation, it is
translated into an internal identifier which indicates the oid of
pg_security system catalog. If it was not found, PGACE/SE-PostgreSQL
inserts a new tuple and applies its oid as an internal identifier.
If a same new security context is given within same currentCommandId
twice or more, it tries to insert a new tuple into pg_security twice
or more. However, it violates uniqueness constraint at oid of pg_security.
Thus, we had to look up pg_security with SnapshotSelf scanning mode
as a fallback when SearchSysCache() returns invalid tuple. But we can
apply same approach here. So, InsertSysCache() is invoked to keep
a newly inserted security context until next CommandIdIncrement().
* When a user inserts or deletes a tuple within pg_largeobject directly,
it can also means create a new larageobject, or drop ones.
In SE-PostgreSQL model, it requires 'create' or 'drop' permission,
so we had to check whether the tuple is the first/last one, or not.
In this case, we assumes inserting a tuple into pg_largeobject directly
has a possibility to create new largeobject, and 'create' permission
should be always evaluated, not only 'write'.
This assumption kills to scan pg_largeobject for each insertion/deletion.
If requests come from lowrite() or lo_create(), we can distinguish its
meanings, so proper permissions are applied in the most cases.
I guess the InsertSysCache() will be an arguable interface, but it can resolve
our problem with minimum impact and utilizing existing facilities, so it is
better than any other solutuions.
o A new guc parameter to enable/disable SE-PostgreSQL
It can take four options, as follows:
sepostgresql = [ default | enforcing | permissive | disabled ]
- default: always follows kernel setting (default)
- enforcing: works in enforcing mode (MAC and audit enabled).
- permissive: works in permissive mode (audit log only).
- disabled: disables SE-PostgreSQL feature.
o PGACE hooks are inlined
The contains of src/backend/security/pgaceHooks.c are moved to
src/include/security/pgace.h and inlined.
It enables to reduce cost to invoke empty function when this
feature is disabled.
o Generic writable system column
SystemAttributeIsWritable() can abstract what system attribute is writable.
(Currently, the security system catalog is the only one writable.)
If it returns true on the target of INSERT, UPDATE or SELECT INTO, these
TargetEntries are marked as junk, and we can fetch its value on ExecutorRun()
separated from any other regular attribute.
o early security design
In the previous one, we stores a relationship between security id and
text representation on bootstraping mode, because pg_security system
catalog is not constructed yet in this time.
The current version holds them in-memory cache and writes out on the tail
of the bootstraping process.
o Documentation updates
The doc/src/sgml/security.sgml gives us a short description of SE-PostgreSQL
and PGACE security framework. In addition, we added source code comments for
most of functions, including PGACE hooks.
o Miscellaneous updates
* Two separated patches (pgace and sepgsql) are integrated into one.
* Copyrights are changed to "PostgreSQL Global Development Group".
* Several PGACE hooks are added, redefined and removed.
* Now, we can run regression test without any problem, except for two
tests which can be explained reasonably.
* SELinux state monitoring process is implemented using an existing
facilities provided by postmaster.c.
* Coding styles are fixed.
* A definition of LWlock is moved to storage/lwlock.h
* Definitions of SEvalItemXXXX are moved to nodes/nodes.h
* Compiler warnings come from SE-PostgreSQL are killed.
* Some error codes are added within 'SE' class, and elog()s which can
report user facing messages are replaced by ereport().
* Shell function is removed from genbki.sh.
* Default security context of files consider --prefix setting in
configure script.
Regression Tests
================
Now we remain two test fails, but these can be explained reasonably.
The first fail (create_function_1) means that SE-PostgreSQL detects
a client attempt to load an invalid file before core PostgreSQL doing,
and generates its error message.
The later one (sanity_check) means the regression test can detect
an increation of system catalogs correctly.
(*) Turn on "sepgsql_regression_test_mode" boolean of SELinux before
regression test. It enables you to load shared library modules
installed under user's home directory.
# /usr/sbin/setsebool sepgsql_regression_test_mode on
$ make check
:
(snip)
:
========================
2 of 115 tests failed.
========================
[kaigai@saba pgsql]$ less src/test/regress/regression.diffs
*** ./expected/create_function_1.out Fri Jun 20 14:55:12 2008
--- ./results/create_function_1.out Fri Jun 20 14:55:28 2008
***************
*** 72,78 ****
ERROR: only one AS item needed for language "sql"
CREATE FUNCTION test1 (int) RETURNS int LANGUAGE C
AS 'nosuchfile';
! ERROR: could not access file "nosuchfile": No such file or directory
CREATE FUNCTION test1 (int) RETURNS int LANGUAGE C
AS '/home/kaigai/tmp/e/pgsql/src/test/regress/regress.so', 'nosuchsymbol';
ERROR: could not find function "nosuchsymbol" in file "/home/kaigai/tmp/e/pgsql/src/test/regress/regress.so
"
--- 72,78 ----
ERROR: only one AS item needed for language "sql"
CREATE FUNCTION test1 (int) RETURNS int LANGUAGE C
AS 'nosuchfile';
! ERROR: SELinux: could not get context of nosuchfile
CREATE FUNCTION test1 (int) RETURNS int LANGUAGE C
AS '/home/kaigai/tmp/e/pgsql/src/test/regress/regress.so', 'nosuchsymbol';
ERROR: could not find function "nosuchsymbol" in file "/home/kaigai/tmp/e/pgsql/src/test/regress/regress.so
"
======================================================================
*** ./expected/sanity_check.out Sun Nov 25 12:49:12 2007
--- ./results/sanity_check.out Fri Jun 20 14:55:31 2008
***************
*** 111,116 ****
--- 111,117 ----
pg_pltemplate | t
pg_proc | t
pg_rewrite | t
+ pg_security | t
pg_shdepend | t
pg_shdescription | t
pg_statistic | t
***************
*** 149,155 ****
timetz_tbl | f
tinterval_tbl | f
varchar_tbl | f
! (138 rows)
--
-- another sanity check: every system catalog that has OIDs should have
--- 150,156 ----
timetz_tbl | f
tinterval_tbl | f
varchar_tbl | f
! (139 rows)
--
-- another sanity check: every system catalog that has OIDs should have
--
OSS Platform Development Division, NEC
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
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